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The 2002 Supreme Court Decisions: Did
They Leave Enough of Apprendi to
Effectively Protect Criminal Defendants?
INTRODUCTION

wo defendants are arrested in different states for committing the
same exact crime-armed robbery with an automatic weapon
resulting in injury to one person. Defendant One is indicted in his
state under a statute that provides for a fifty-year maximum for armed
robbery, but allows for an increase in that sentence based on the finding of
aggravating factors, including use of an automatic weapon and injury to
another person in the course of the offense. Since the prosecution is
seeking an increase in the maximum sentence for the offense, they are
required to prove the aggravating factors to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury finds Defendant One guilty of the offense of armed
robbery, but not of the aggravating factors. At the sentencing phase, the
prosecution is again permitted to try to prove the aggravating factors to the
judge, but under a lower standard of proof this time-preponderance of the
evidence. The judge finds these facts, but is only allowed to impose a
sentence up to the fifty-year maximum. He decides instead to impose a
thirty-year sentence because this is Defendant One's first offense.
Defendant Two is indicted in his state under a statute that requires a
thirty-year mandatory minimum sentence for armed robbery, which is
increased to fifty years if an automatic weapon is used and is increased
again to life imprisonment if a person is injured in the course of the
offense. The only question presented to the jury is whether Defendant Two
committed the armed robbery, which they find beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the sentencing stage, the judge determines the factors that raise the
mandatory minimum of the sentence by a preponderance of the evidence.
The judge finds both that the offense was committed with an automatic
weapon and that a person was injured in the course of the robbery, which
means that the judge is required by law to impose a life sentence, even if he
would like to impose a lesser sentence based on the fact that this is
Defendant Two's first offense.
In several recent opinions, the United States Supreme Court has
decided that Defendant One is entitled to greater constitutional protection
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in sentencing than Defendant Two.' In Defendant One's state the judge
could not surpass the maximum sentence authorized by statute without the
jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors
existed.2 The judge could, however, impose any sentence lower than the
maximum at his own discretion: Defendant Two, on the other hand, is
serving a life sentence for the same offense because in his state those same
aggravating factors are determined by the judge by a preponderance of the
evidence and the judge has no discretion to lower a sentence based on
mitigating factors. Looking at the above hypothetical, Defendant Two is
clearly in need of just as much procedural due process protection at the
sentencing phase as Defendant One. The Supreme Court, however, refused
to extend this protection to Defendant Two, determining that as long as the
judge was sentencing within the range authorized by the jury verdict for the
offense, he could determine aggravating factors by a preponderance of the
evidence standard.4 The prosecution in Defendant One's state, however,
was required to submit those same aggravating factors to a jury for
determination beyond a reasonable doubt because that finding could have
increased Defendant One's sentence above the statutory maximum. 5 In
drawing the line at whether a sentence is within or outside the sentencing
range, the Supreme Court tried to create a bright-line rule to protect
defendants by limiting judicial discretion at sentencing. The Court ended
up, however, with a rule that provides little protection for defendants that
legislatures can easily circumvent by cleverly redrafting statutes to ensure
that courts are sentencing within the range allowed by the statute.
Part I of this comment will explore the case that began all of the
controversy, Apprendi v. New Jersey.6 It will touch on several cases prior
to Apprendi and discuss their impact on the Court's decision. It will then
explore the reasoning behind the Court's holding and look at how the Court
distinguished three cases that clearly conflicted with Apprendi's holding.
Finally, Part I will discuss Justice Thomas' strong concurrence and the
equally strong dissenting opinions.
Part II will look at the tremendous amount of controversy that has
been generated by the decision in Apprendi. It will focus on three specific
areas: mandatory minimums, the potential for legislative manipulation, and

I.
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Harris v. United States, 536
U.S. 545 (2002); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.584 (2002).
2.
3.

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
See id.

5.

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

4.
6.

See Harris, 536 U.S. at 557.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
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the impact of the decision on the defendant. First, the question of whether
Apprendi applies to mandatory minimums is of crucial importance as it has
the potential of invalidating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, as well as
numerous determinate sentencing schemes in the states.7 Second, many
commentators have argued that the flexible structure of the rule in
Apprendi gave legislatures room to redraft their statutes in order to avoid
8
application of the rule. Finally, while Apprendi was viewed by many as a
triumph for the rights of the defendant, others believed that the burdens of
the decision would come to outweigh the benefits. 9
Part III will examine three recent Supreme Court decisions and their
holdings, and analyze their impact on Apprendi. Part IV will argue that the
Supreme Court, both in these recent opinions and in their refusal to
overrule others in Apprendi, has been inconsistent and unable to adhere to a
unifying principle in their efforts to protect defendants. The Court should
therefore overrule Apprendi in favor of an alternative that would more
effectively protect the procedural due process rights of all defendants at
sentencing.

I. APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY
0
In June of 2000 the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey,
a significant case that threatened to completely change the structure of
sentencing in this country. Many "dire predictions" were made that the
Court's decision could potentially invalidate the- Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and many states' determinate sentencing schemes."
These
predictions were based in part on the concern expressed by Justice

7.

See, e.g., Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines:

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 796-97

(2002).

The Guidelines,

promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission, sought to limit judicial
discretion by requiring "judges to increase or decrease ...presumptive [sentencing] ranges
by specified amounts if they find certain aggravating or mitigating facts." Stephanos Bibas,
How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. REV. 465, 467 (2002)
[hereinafter Bibas I].
8.

See,

e.g.,

Jacqueline E.

Ross,

Unanticipated

Consequences of Turning

Sentencing Factors into Offense Elements: The Apprendi Debate, FED. SENT. R., Vol. 12,

No. 4, at 201 (2000).
9.
See, e.g., Bibas I, supra note 7, at 465.
10.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
I1.
Alex Ricciardulli, The U.S. Supreme Court's Surprise Ruling on Sentence
Enhancements: The Court Strikes Down a Hate Crime Enhancement and Leaves Others in
Some Doubt, Los ANGELES LAWYER, Feb. 2001, at 15 (arguing that Apprendi will not

impact determinate sentencing laws, but may affect double jeopardy, some states' death
penalty laws, and California's three-strikes law).
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O'Connor in her strong dissent to Apprendi that "the apparent effect of the

Court's opinion today is . . . to invalidate with the stroke of a pen three

decades' worth of nationwide reform, all in the name of a principle with a
questionable constitutional pedigree."' 2 Prior to its controversial decision
in Apprendi, the Court had for the most part allowed legislatures a free
hand in determining whether the judge or jury should make findings on an
issue.13 In Apprendi, the Court attempted to severely limit that authority in
order to "protect criminal defendants from the potentially arbitrary exercise
of power by prosecutors and judges,"' 14 but as will be explained later,
Apprendi actually gave prosecutors more power in some areas and left the
door wide open for legislatures
to avoid its rule by putting control back into
5
the hands of the court.'
A. FACTS AND LOWER COURT DECISIONS

In the early morning of December 22, 1994, Charles Apprendi fired a
gun into the home of an African-American family that had just moved into
the all-white neighborhood of Vineland, New Jersey.' 6 He was arrested
that same night and apparently made a statement to the police that he did
not want the family in the neighborhood because of their race.' 7 Apprendi
plead guilty to two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose and one count of third-degree unlawful possession of an
antipersonnel bomb.' 8 Under state law the penalty range for the seconddegree offenses was five to ten years and for the third-degree offense the
range was three to five years.' 9 In exchange for dismissing twenty other
counts against Apprendi, the prosecutor reserved the right to request an
enhanced sentence on one count involving the shooting on December 22,
claiming it was committed with a biased purpose under New Jersey's hate
crime statute. 20 Apprendi in turn reserved the right to claim that the hate

12.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550.
13.
Ricciardulli, supra note 11, at 16; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 604 (1994) (stating that "'[t]he definition of the elements of a criminal offense is
entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely
creatures of statute"') (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550.
See, e.g., Bibas I, supra note 7, at 468-74.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470.

Id.
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crime sentence enhancement violated the United States Constitution.2'
During sentencing the trial judge determined by a preponderance of the
evidence that racial bias was the motivating factor behind Apprendi's
actions based on the statement that Apprendi made to police.22 Rejecting
Apprendi's constitutional challenge, the judge applied the hate crime
enhancement, raising the maximum on that count from ten years to twenty
years.2 3 Apprendi was subsequently sentenced to twelve years on that
count and to concurrent sentences on the other two counts.24
Apprendi appealed, claiming that the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution required that a jury make a finding of biased purpose beyond a
reasonable doubt. 25 The state appellate court, based on the Supreme
Court's decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,26 upheld Apprendi's
sentence, determining that the hate crime enhancement was a "sentencing
factor" and not an offense element that would have to be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.27 A divided New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed, first asserting that the mere fact that the legislature had placed the
hate crime enhancement within the sentencing provisions in the statute did
not mean that it could not be an offense element.2 8 In the end, however, the
majority decided that the legislature had simply taken a traditional
sentencing factor and determined the weight courts were to assign to that
factor.29
B. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
New Jersey Supreme Court in a five-four decision. 3 Before going into the
Court's rationale in Apprendi, however, two earlier opinions that had
significant influence on the Court's decision in Apprendi are worth noting.
The first is In re Winship, in which the Court explicitly held that "the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 470-7 1.
Id. at 471.
Id.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 47 1.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 474.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

with which he is charged.'
In Apprendi, the critical question then became
whether a particular fact was an element of the offense, requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt under Winship, or a sentencing factor, not
requiring such constitutional protection. The second decision to influence
Apprendi is Jones v. United States,32 in which the Court foreshadowed their
opinion in Apprendi by stating in a footnote:
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.3 3
While the Court in Jones was construing a federal statute, the Court in
Apprendi determined that the same principle should apply to a state statute
34
through the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, based on past precedent and history, the Court reaffirmed
Jones by holding that except for "prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 35 The Court
determined that any rise in the maximum sentence of a defendant is of
constitutional significance because of the actual increase in number of
years behind bars and because it has "significant implications both for a
defendant's very liberty, and for the heightened stigma associated with an
36
offense the legislature has selected as worthy of greater punishment.,
The Court concluded that the proper determination was "one not of form,
but of effect"-ldid the judge make a finding that had the potential of
increasing the defendant's sentence to a level above that authorized by the
jury verdict? 37 If so, that finding was an element of the offense and had to
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

In re Winship, 297 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
Id. at 243 n.6.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 494.
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C. DISTINGUISHING PRIOR DECISIONS

Several past precedents created problems for the holding in Apprendi,
requiring the Court to either reconcile or overturn them. In the first of
those cases, Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the Supreme Court had
determined that the Constitution did not require recidivism to be treated as
an element of an offense.3 8 The holding in Apprendi conflicted with
Almendarez-Torres because a finding of recidivism could easily elevate 39a
defendant's sentence above the maximum allowed by the jury verdict.
The Court concluded, however, that recidivism was an exception to the
Apprendi rule because "the defendant [already] had the right to a jury trial
and the right to require the prosecutor
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
40
doubt" for the earlier offenses.
Another Supreme Court decision that clearly conflicted with the
holding of Apprendi was that of Walton v. Arizona, in which the Supreme
Court upheld Arizona's capital sentencing scheme. 4' The validity of this
system became questionable under Apprendi because it allowed judges to
make findings of aggravating factors that would raise a defendant's
sentence from life imprisonment to death 4 2 The Court in Apprendi
distinguished Walton by interpreting the Arizona statute as allowing for the
maximum penalty of death and leaving it to the judge to determine if that
maximum penalty should be imposed rather than a lesser one, such as life
imprisonment.4 3
The final case that presented a problem for the Court was McMillan v.
Pennsylvania.44 In McMillan the Court upheld Pennsylvania's Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act, which provided that a person convicted of
certain enumerated felonies would be subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years upon a finding by the trial judge that the person
"visibly possessed a firearm" while committing the offense.4 5 In
determining that visible possession of a firearm was merely a sentencing
factor rather than an element of the offense, the Supreme Court in
McMillan concluded that the state legislature had not altered the existing
offense, but rather had "[taken] one factor that has always been considered

38.
39.
40.
41.

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998).
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488.
Id. at 496.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).

43.
44.
45.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 81.

42.

See id. at 645.
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by sentencing courts to bear on punishment . . . and [had] dictated the

precise weight to be given that factor. 4 6 The statute was not tailored to
allow the finding of that factor to be the "tail which wags the dog of the
substantive offense. 47 The Court distinguished Apprendi's situation in
that the potential increase in Apprendi's sentence based on a judge's
finding by a preponderance of the evidence from ten years to twenty years
had more than a "nominal effect" and increased the maximum punishment
authorized by the jury verdict. 48 49Thus, it became the "'tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense.'
D. THOMAS' CONCURRENCE

Justice Thomas, concurring in Apprendi, would have carried the
holding of the case further and would have overruled two of the three cases
discussed above. His broad definition of crime would include "every fact
that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment., 50 Thus,
every finding of an aggravating factor, even the fact of a prior conviction,
would make up the crime and therefore would have to be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.5' Accordingly, Thomas stated that even though
at the time Almendarez-Torres was decided he was in the majority, he
would now overrule it.52 "If a fact is by law the basis for imposing or
increasing punishment-for establishing or increasing the prosecution's
entitlement-it is an element." 53 Thus, since recidivism is often used as a
basis for increasing punishment, Thomas would conclude that it is an
element of the underlying offense.54 The same would be said for facts
which establish mandatory minimums, such as those in McMillan.55 While
Thomas conceded that a defendant could be sentenced to the same term
with or without a mandatory minimum, he would still require that any fact
increasing the defendant's possible sentence within a range be determined
by a jury because "the prosecution is empowered, by invoking the
mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment

46.
47.

Id. at 89-90.

49.
50.

Id. (quoting McMillan, 47 U.S. at 88).
Id. at 501.

48.

51.

52.
53.

54.
55.

Id. at 88.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495.

See id.

Id. at 520-21.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 521.

Id.
Id. at 521-22.
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than he might wish. 5 6 Finally, Thomas addressed the capital scheme in
Walton, in which the judge is permitted to find aggravating factors that
potentially expose the defendant to a greater punishment. 57 Based on
Thomas' earlier principle, that fact would clearly be an element of the
crime.58 Due to the unique nature of capital crimes, however, and the
barrier that the Court has "interposed between a jury finding of a capital
crime and a court's ability to impose capital punishment," Thomas declined
to come to the conclusion that his principle would apply to capital
sentencing schemes such as that in Arizona.5 9 Instead, he left it as "a
question for another day. ' 6°
E. THE DISSENTS

Justice O'Connor, writing the dissent for four justices, did not find the
Court's justifications for its new bright-line rule6 convincing, partly because
she believed the Court was ignoring precedent. '
In its opinion, the Court marshals virtually no authority to
support its extraordinary rule. Indeed, it is remarkable that
the Court cannot identify a single instance, in the over 200
years since the ratification of the Bill of Rights, that our
Court has applied, as a constitutional requirement, the rule
it announces today.62
In O'Connor's view, an enhancement based on motive, such as that in
Apprendi, and one based on commission of a prior offense, as in
Almendarez-Torres, is a "difference without constitutional importance"
since "[b]oth factors are traditional bases for increasing an offender's
sentence and, therefore, may serve as the grounds for a sentence
enhancement., 63 O'Connor also found the majority's reliance on McMillan
"puzzling" since its holding points to a rejection of the Apprendi rule. 64 In
her opinion, the majority's holding applies to any finding of fact that

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 522.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522.
Id. at 523.
Id.
Id. at 525.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 554.
Id. at 532.
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"increases or alters the range of penalties to which a defendant is
exposed," and therefore the Court must overrule McMillan and explain the
appropriateness of this decision, based on principles of stare decisis.65 The

majority did neither, instead deriving a rule from McMillan that was never
there.66 Thus, O'Connor concluded that the New Jersey legislature stayed
within the bounds of McMillan by taking a "traditional sentencing factor
67
and dictat[ing] the precise weight judges should attach to that factor.,
Finally, O'Connor found the Court's distinction of Walton "baffling, to say
the least." 68 She believed that the Court's decision in Walton clearly
conflicted with the Court's holding in Apprendi because a defendant
convicted of first-degree murder could only be sentenced to death upon the
judge's finding of a statutory aggravating factor under the Arizona
sentencing scheme upheld in Walton.69 The scheme, therefore, violated
Apprendi in allowing the judge to make a determination elevating the
maximum sentence for the crime from life imprisonment to death. 7°
O'Connor failed to understand how the majority could allow the state to
"remove from the jury a factual determination that makes the difference
between life and death," but the "State cannot do the same with respect to a
factual determination that results in only a 10-year increase in the
O'Connor found
maximum sentence to which a defendant is exposed.'
the majority's attempt to distinguish these cases unconvincing and "[o]n
the basis of . . . prior precedent" would have held the New Jersey

enhancement statute constitutional.7 2
In a separate dissent Justice Breyer expressed his concerns about the
practical implications of the majority's rule. While a rule requiring juries
instead of judges to determine facts upon which increased punishment is
based would "seem to promote a procedural ideal," he believed that the
"real world of criminal justice cannot hope to meet any such ideal. It can
function only with the help of procedural compromises, particularly in
respect to sentencing., 73 The traditional basis for allowing judges to decide
facts affecting the length of sentences rather than juries was not to reflect
"an ideal of procedural 'fairness' . . . but rather an administrative need for

65.
66.
67.

ld. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 553-54.

68.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538.

73.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 555.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id. at 554.
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procedural compromise."74 Breyer believes this compromise is necessary
due to the overwhelming number of potential sentencing factors that could
be submitted to a single jury for consideration. 75 Taking into account the
varying backgrounds, experiences, and education of the men and women
on the jury, requiring them to deliberate on all such factors is
impracticable.7 6 Thus, Breyer supports the contention that evaluation of
those potentially endless factors should be left to judges and their vast
amounts of experience.7 7 Another problem resulting from the holding in
Apprendi, according to Breyer, is that in requiring submission of all facts
relevant to guilt or innocence and enhancements to the jury, the Apprendi
rule puts the defendant in the awkward position of having to deny his guilt
while also offering proof as to how he committed the crime.78 Lastly,
Breyer cannot reconcile the majority's decision with their holding in
McMillan because in his view the mandatory minimum is of far greater
importance to a defendant than maximum sentences, since a judge is
allowed to impose any sentence below a statute's maximum, but he cannot
select a sentence below the mandatory minimum. 79 Why is a new crime
created when the legislature "authorizes a judge to impose a higher penalty
for bank robbery," but not when the legislature "requires a judge to impose
a higher penalty than he otherwise would" in similar circumstances? 80 So
while the goal of the majority in adopting their rule in Apprendi may have
been to further protect a defendant's procedural due process rights, Breyer
believes that application of the rule may actually result in "significantly
less procedural fairness, not more.",8' Breyer supports a sentencing system
in which judges have discretion because it is "workable" and "consistent
with the Constitution. 82 Such a system may lead to "greater fairness
because judges will better preserve equality of sentencing across cases if
guided by statutes or sentencing guidelines. 8 3

74.
75.
76.

Id. at 556 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 556-57.
B. Patrick Costello, Jr., Comment, Apprendi v. New Jersey: "Who Decides

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 557.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 564.

What Constitutes a Crime?" An Analysis of Whether a Legislature is ConstitutionallyFree
to "Allocate" an Element of an Offense to an Affirmative Defense or a Sentencing Factor
Without Judicial Review, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1205, 1254 (2002).
77.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 558.

82.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 559.
83.
John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 562 (2002).
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IN THE WAKE OFAPPRENDI

Due to the close decision in Apprendi and its potential to wreak havoc
on determinate sentencing schemes, the true impact of the decision has
been subject to considerable debate among commentators and courts. One
of the major areas of controversy has been whether Apprendi applies to
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes. Since this is largely the
structure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, interpreting Apprendi
broadly enough to apply to mandatory minimums could have spelled the
end of the Guidelines. 84 Another area of concern after Apprendi was the
ease with which legislatures could avoid the application of Apprendi's rule
by cleverly redrafting statutes.85 Finally, Apprendi generated considerable86
debate as to whether its rule in fact helped defendants or hurt them.
While the Court ended some of this controversy in the 2002 term, it is
helpful to review some of the post-Apprendi debate in order to determine
the impact of the 2002 cases.
A. MANDATORY MINIMUMS

One question that many believed went unanswered in Apprendi was
whether its rule applied to sentencing schemes based on mandatory
minimums. While the holding of the case only applied to facts that
"increase[d] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum, ' 87 other language in the opinion made its application
questionable to facts which simply increased a defendant's sentence within
a range, but not beyond the maximum. For instance, Justice Stevens'
statement that the inquiry as to whether a fact was an element or a
sentencing factor was "one not of form, but of effect" concluded with the
question of whether the finding exposed the defendant "to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict. '88 Language
such as this in the Court's opinion left their position on mandatory
minimums subject to debate. In addition, Justice Thomas made the exact
stance of the Court even more uncertain by unequivocally stating in his
concurrence that the rule should be extended to mandatory minimum

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See, e.g., Standen, supra note 7, at 796-97.
See, e.g., Ross, supra note 8, at 201.
See, e.g., Bibas I, supra note 7, at 465.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
Id. at 494.
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sentences. 89 Thus, with the exact position of the Supreme Court uncertain,
both courts and commentators have been divided as to whether to apply
Apprendi to mandatory minimums. For the most part state and federal
appellate courts followed the narrow holding of Apprendi and did not apply
it to cases involving mandatory minimums. 90 The only exception was the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which applied Apprendi to mandatory
minimums until the 2002 Supreme Court decisions came down. 9' Most
likely the appellate courts feared the potential impact that Apprendi would
have on criminal sentencing at local, state and federal levels, so they
conservatively chose to narrowly construe Apprendi in expectation of a
determination from the Supreme Court as to how far the holding would be
extended.9 2
Commentators are split as well on the application of Apprendi to facts
which trigger mandatory minimums, with an apparent majority determining
that the logic of Apprendi should extend to mandatory minimums. "For
Apprendi to have teeth, it would have to reach all facts that affect the actual
punishment imposed," not just those 93facts that increase a defendant's
sentence above the statutory maximum.
In both kinds of determinate sentencing, the offender faces
a more onerous sentence than he otherwise would, based
on a sentencing factor that has not been proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. If Winship is evaded by
increases in the statutory maximum sentence, then it is just

89.
Id. at 521-22.
90.
United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v.
Norris, 281 F.3d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Harris, 243 F.3d 806, 809 (4th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Sandoval, 241 F.3d 549, 550-51 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220
F.3d 926, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Singleton, 177 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38
(D.D.C. 2001); People v. Gardner, 55 P.3d 231, 235 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); People v.
Phillips, 759 N.E.2d 946, 950 (Il. App. Ct. 2001).
91.
United States v. Ramirez, 242 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Hough, 276 F.3d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 397
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 2002) (overruling
earlier cases in light of recent Supreme Court decision United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545

(2002)).

92.
See Analisa Swan, Note, Apprendi v. New Jersey, The Scaling Back of the
Sentencing Factor Revolution and the Resurrection of Criminal Defendant Rights, How Far
is Too Far?, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 729, 784 (2002).

93.
Bibas I, supra note 7, at 469; see also McGinnis, supra note 83, at 564 (stating
that "the inner logic of the decision would embrace the broader rule of law" of applying
Apprendi to mandatory minimums).
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as clearly evaded by legislative impositions of mandatory
minimums.94

Therefore, if the Court is willing to force judges to adhere to
mandatory minimums, which can result in "arbitrary and potentially severe
sentence[s]," then the Court should also be willing to uphold a scheme
which gives judges more flexibility in sentencing, such as that in
Apprendi.95 As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent in Apprendi,
mandatory minimums are of more concern to defendants because a judge is
bound to impose the mandatory minimum if he finds a particular fact, while
96
a judge is free to impose a sentence below a statutory maximum.
Applying the rule in Apprendi only to facts that increase sentences above
the statutory maximum:
ignores the reality that whenever a court enhances a
defendant's sentence ... based on conduct proven only by
a preponderance of the evidence, the court deprives the
defendant of liberty without the protection of the
reasonable doubt standard - a clear violation of the
constitutional liberty protections identified in In re
Winship.97
Even though most courts chose not to extend Apprendi to mandatory
minimums, perhaps fearing the impact of such a decision on determinate
sentencing schemes, the overwhelming belief of commentators that
Apprendi should logically apply to mandatory minimums suggests that if
the Court declines to do so in the future, they are not applying the rule of
Apprendi in such a way as to truly protect the procedural due process rights
of defendants.

94.
Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 443 (2002).
95.
Erron W. Smith, Case Notes, Apprendi v. New Jersey: The United States
Supreme Court Restricts Judicial Sentencing Discretion and Raises Troubling
Constitutional Questions Concerning Sentencing Statutes and Reforms Nationwide, 54 ARK.

L. REV. 649, 678 (2001).
96.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 563 (2000).
97.
Thomas M. Morrow, Note, Apprendi v. New Jersey: In the "Sleeper Decision of
2000, " the Supreme Court Restores Constitutional Protections to (Some) Criminal
Defendants, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1065, 1094 (2001) (arguing that the Court's adherence to past

precedent in Apprendi may have limited its ability to protect the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants).
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LEGISLATIVE MANIPULATION OF STATUTES

Justice O'Connor, in her Apprendi dissent, introduced a second area of
debate generated by the Court's holding. Assuming that Apprendi does not
apply to mandatory minimums, then its holding appears to have no real
meaning beyond punishing "legislatures for not jumping through the right
drafting hoops." 98 If Apprendi only applies to findings of fact which raise
the defendant's punishment above that of the statutory maximum, then "[a]
State could ...

remove from the jury (and subject to a standard of proof

below *beyond a reasonable doubt') the assessment of those facts that
define narrower ranges of punishment, within the overall statutory range,
to which the defendant may be sentenced." 99 Legislatures can easily avoid
the rule in Apprendi by either returning to indeterminate sentencing ranges,
giving judges more power, or raising statutory maxima, allowing judges to
impose lesser sentences if they find certain mitigating factors.' °° Thus, the
New Jersey legislature could cure its sentencing scheme by setting a range
of punishment for weapons possession from five to twenty years, with a
provision that a sentence greater than ten years can only be imposed if a
judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant acted
with the intent to intimidate based on race.' 0 ' This example illustrates the
fact that by cleverly redrafting statutes legislatures can turn aggravating
factors that trigger application of Apprendi into mitigating factors which
are currently at the discretion of the judiciary. 02 "This course could appeal
to legislatures unwilling to choose between eliminating gradations of
offense severity in their
penalty scheme and reallocating such questions
03
from judge to jury."'
The majority in Apprendi recognized such a possibility, but brushed it
off in a footnote. "While a State could, hypothetically, undertake to revise
its entire criminal code in the manner the dissent suggests . . . this

possibility seems remote."' 4 The majority relied on "structural democratic
constraints" to prevent legislatures from acting to create maximum
sentences that were not proportional to the crime.' 05 One commentator

98.
99.

Bibas 1,supra note 7, at 469.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 540 (emphasis in original).

100.
Bibas I, supra note 7, at 468; see also Costello, supra note 76, at 1245-46
(discussing two possible interpretations of Apprendi and how legislatures could get around

either one).
101.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 540.

103.
104.
105.

Id.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n. 16.
Id.

102.

See Ross, supra note 8, at 201.
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found this suggestion "implausible" because in order to appear tough on
crime, legislators could choose to raise maximum sentences in the hope of
gaining political points with their constituents.10 6 If, however, these
constraints failed to operate and legislatures did undertake extensive
revision of their statutes in light of Apprendi, the Court left open the
possibility that these revisions could be reviewed for constitutionality.10 7
The Court has never determined, however, that legislatures must define
crimes in a particular way. 0 8 "Instead, the Court has contented itself with
elaborating constitutional doctrines that limited the ability of legislatures to
shift burdens of proof, create factual presumptions, convert elements to
sentencing factors, or recharacterize elements of crimes as affirmative
defenses."' 9 It would be "incompatible with the sporadic interventions
characteristic of judicial oversight" for the courts to take the time to
identify essential elements of every crime." 0
C. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OFAPPRENDIFOR DEFENDANTS

A third area of disagreement generated by the holding in Apprendi is
its actual impact on defendants. "Although Apprendi appears to be a
victory for the constitutional rights of defendants, in reality it is not.""'
The Court in Apprendi expressed concern as to loss of liberty and the
heightened stigma that attaches to sentences increased beyond the statutory
maximum when they decided that the protections of Winship should apply
to findings of fact that increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory
maximum.112 One commentator has argued that sentence enhancements do
not heighten the stigma associated with a crime because it is the label of the
crime that carries the stigma. 3 Thus, the stigma will be the same for a
person who committed burglary as it will be for a person who committed
burglary while carrying a weapon." 4 Similarly, the stigma and loss of
liberty will be the same whether connected with an increase in the
maximum sentence or with an increase within a sentencing range, once

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Bibas I, supra note 7, at 469.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491 n. 16.
Standen, supra note 7, at 782.
Id.
Id.
111.
Id. at 800.
112.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
113.
Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancementsin a World
of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1133 (2001) [hereinafter Bibas II].
114.
Id.
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again providing no justification for excluding mandatory minimums from
the rule."I5 So if the Apprendi rule does not reach the concerns of the
majority, does it provide any additional benefits to the defendant that he did
not have before the rule?
The practical benefits of Apprendi's rule include ...better

protection for defendants, enhanced accuracy of factfinding under a reasonable doubt standard, and additional
certainty from replacing multi-factor standards with a
bright-line test. But Apprendi's analysis overlooks a
number of unintended consequences of his6 proposal that
call into question its predicted advantages.''
One of those unintended consequences is the pressure the new rule
will put on defendants to produce evidence at trial that prior to Apprendi
would only have been brought out at the sentencing phase.' '7 Defendants,
who would previously have chosen not to present evidence or testify under
Apprendi, now have "to choose between remaining silent in the hope of
acquittal or presenting evidence that might be inconsistent with innocence
in the hope of avoiding an adverse finding on aggravating factors." 18 For
example, after Apprendi, a defendant would be forced to simultaneously
argue before a jury: "I did not commit the burglary, but if I did, I was not
carrying a weapon at the time." This example suggests another negative
impact of the Apprendi rule on the defendant. If the defendant is forced to
rebut evidence of aggravating factors, such as racial bias, during the trial,
this unfortunate necessity will likely have a prejudicial impact on the final
decision the jury reaches on the actual offense."19 Thus, higher conviction
rates could result from forcing the defendant to present evidence that would
previously only have been brought up at sentencing. 20 Judges are far more
likely to deal with such factors rationally and even-handedly than juries
made up of average members of the community who do not deal with that
type of information on a regular basis. 121
One suggestion that has been made to address both the problem of
forcing a defendant to simultaneously argue inconsistent defenses and the

115.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.at 1134.

Ross, supra note 8, at 197.
Id.at 199.
Id.
See Smith, supra note 95, at 690.
See Costello, supra note 76, at 1257.
Smith, supra note 95, at 691.
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problem of the prejudicial impact on the defendant is the use of a bifurcated
trial. As Justice Breyer mentioned in his dissent in Apprendi, however,
bifurcated trials, with the exception of capital cases, have not seemed
"worth their administrative costs.' 22 In addition, bifurcation would add
yet another stage to the trial process, it would place additional burdens on
jurors and witnesses, and it could prove cumbersome in trials involving
multiple defendants with multiple enhancements. Q3
Indeed, the very suggestion that the jury should bifurcate
its fact-finding between issues bearing on guilt and issues
bearing on degrees of culpability reveals the difference in
function between fact-finding at trial and fact-finding at
sentencing, and the inherent tension between the two.
Relegating certain factual issues to sentencing gives
defendants the opportunity to avail themselves of their
right to silence at trial without
forfeiting the opportunity to
24
be heard in mitigation. 1
A final argument against the use of bifurcation is that it would
"perversely" lead prosecutors to approach the worst offenders with the
most enhancements with extremely favorable plea offers in order to avoid a
long, drawn-out trial. 25 Thus, while bifurcation may appear to be a good
solution in the abstract, it would be completely unworkable in practice.
Arguing in support of the Apprendi rule, Professors Klein and King
claim that the defendant is actually benefited under Apprendi because the
prosecution is required to prove aggravating facts beyond a reasonable
doubt, rather than by a preponderance of the evidence as was the case prior
to Apprendi. 126 Their argument assumes, however, that the defendant
actually goes to trial, since it is the defendant who is successful in
challenging the aggravator who is benefited or the defendant actually
innocent of those aggravating elements. 27 Today jury trials are not the
norm in criminal cases. Approximately ninety-one percent of felony
defendants plead guilty, while fewer than four percent go before a jury and

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 557 (2000).
Standen, supra note 7, at 794.
Ross, supra note 8, at 200.
Bibas II, supra note 113, at 1144.
Nancy J.King and Susan R. Klein, Comment, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining,
54 STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2001) (refuting Stephanos Bibas' article Judicial Fact-Finding
and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001)).
127.
Id. at 302-03.
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five percent before a judge. 28 Today defendants who were able to plead
guilty prior to Apprendi and still benefit from enhancement hearings at
sentencing, no longer have that option. 2 9 Professor Stephanos Bibas, who
has written numerous articles on the Apprendi decision, argues that the
Apprendi Court, in assuming that jury trials were the norm, "reached the
wrong answer because they asked the wrong question."'' 30 "The myth of
the jury trial is deeply embedded in our culture, our psyche, and our law
school13 1 curricula. But today, the reality is but a faint echo of a bygone
era."'

Based on the rare appearance of a felony defendant before a jury, the
impact of Apprendi on those defendants who choose to plea bargain is
critical to assessing the overall effect of the rule. First, those defendants
who plead guilty under the Apprendi rule will be deprived of their
constitutional right to be heard. 132 The enhancements, which were
previously considered in the sentencing phase of the trial, now are part of
the guilt phase, forcing the defendant to surrender them if he pleads
guilty. 133 Second, a defendant's guilty plea may totally eliminate any
opportunity to raise an Apprendi challenge. 34 As the Illinois Supreme
Court stated in People v. Jackson, a defendant bringing an Apprendi
challenge argues that one or more of the elements of the offense for which
the defendant was charged and convicted was not proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. 135 A defendant, however, who has waived his right to a
jury trial by pleading guilty cannot argue that he has been deprived of his
due process rights. 36 Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty to first-degree
murder under a statute with a maximum sentence of sixty years, who is
then sentenced to natural-life based on the court's determination of
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, has waived his right to bring an
Apprendi challenge.' 37 Finally, Apprendi gives prosecutors more power to
control the sentence that the defendant receives, affording judges fewer

128.
Bibas I, supra note 7, at 465.
129.
Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi and the Dynamics of Guilty Pleas, 54 STAN. L. REV.
311,311 (2001).
130.
Bibas 11,supra note 113, at 1100.
131.
Id. at 1183.
132.
Id. at 1152.
133.
Id.
134.
See People v. Jackson, 769 N.E.2d 21 (111. 2002); Hill v. Cowan, 781 N.E.2d
1065 (III. 2002).
135.
Jackson, 769 N.E.2d at 30.
136.
Id.
137.
See People v. Rhoades, 753 N.E.2d 537 (III. App. Ct. 2001).
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opportunities to check those prosecutors.138 This argument applies both to
defendants who plead guilty and those who go to trial. "What matters is no
longer the defendant's real offense, but the statutory maximum of the
statute cited in the indictment," and it is the prosecutor who determines
which statute to cite. 139 This decision "may reflect racial bias, the quality
and connections of defense counsel, the prosecutor's temperament, and
regional variations."'' 40 Judges traditionally had the power to check these
inconsistencies at the sentencing stage, but under Apprendi the judge's
power to check is limited to statutory maximum sentences.14' Thus, a
prosecutor may elect to treat two identically situated defendants differently,
favoring one with a lesser charge, perhaps because he cooperated fully with
the prosecution. 42 Under Apprendi the judge is constrained by the
maximum sentence for the favored defendant. 43 As these problems
illustrate "[b]y framing the issue anachronistically as one of juries versus
judges, the Court missed the more salient competition between judges and
prosecutors in the real world of guilty pleas."' 44
III. APPRENDI REVISITED
The Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey obviously
left a lot of unanswered questions, and created a large number of new
concerns. The answer to the controversy as to Apprendi's real impact
comes down to how far the Court is willing to extend its holding beyond
"any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum,"'' 45 and how the Court plans to address the unintended
consequences of its decision. In its 2002 term, the Supreme Court decided
three cases that had an impact on how far the holding of Apprendi would
reach, ending some of the controversy. 146 This article will discuss those
cases and their ultimate effect on Apprendi. Then, based on the failure of
any definite, unified principle to emerge from the Apprendi-related
decisions, this article will conclude that the only rational action for the

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
584 (2002);

Bibas I, supra note 113, at 1169-70.
Id. at 1170.
Bibas I, supra note 7, at 471.
See id.
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id. at 474.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
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Court to take is to overrule Apprendi and look for a more practical,
consistent way to protect the procedural due process rights of defendants at
sentencing.
A. UNITED STATES V. COTTON

The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Cotton was the first
to impact Apprendi. While the effect of Cotton on the controversy in the
previous discussion is nominal, it is worth noting because it is the first
limitation on the Apprendi rule expressed by the Court, indicating that
Apprendi may not be as far-reaching as some had feared. The Court in
Cotton confirmed that in federal prosecutions the aggravating factors
required in Apprendi to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt must
be charged in the indictment. 47 Thus, if Apprendi had been a federal court
case, the prosecutor would have been required to charge in the indictment
that the crime had been racially motivated. 48 If the prosecutor failed to do
so, however, the Supreme Court held in Cotton that the defendant was not
entitled to automatic resentencing, but instead courts are to apply the plain
error test. 149 At the end of the opinion, the Court made it clear that the
plain error test would be difficult to meet.1-5 An example of plain error,
according to the Court, would be if defendants, clearly involved in a "vast
drug conspiracy," were given sentences meant for less serious drug
offenders "because of an error that was never objected to at trial.''
The
Supreme Court in Cotton decided to limit the retroactive effects of
Apprendi in federal cases, thus marking the Court's first check on the
52
impact of Apprendi. 1
B. RING V. ARIZONA

In Ring v. Arizona, the Court chose to extend the logic of Apprendi to
the same capital-sentencing scheme that the Court had upheld in Walton v.

147.

Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627.

148.

See id.

151.

Id.

149. Id. at 631. Under the plain error test, for an appellate court to correct an error
not raised at trial, there must be (1)error, (2) the error must be plain, and (3) the error must
affect substantial rights. If all three are met, then the court may notice a forfeited error, but
only if (4) it seriously affects the fariness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Id. at 631-32.
150. See id. at 634.
152.

See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 628-29.
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Arizona and failed to overrule in Apprendi.153 Timothy Ring. along with
two others. was involved in the armed robbery of an armored van and the
death of its driver. 5 4 Ring was convicted by a jury of felony murder in the
course of armed robbery.155 "Under Arizona law, Ring could not be
sentenced to death. the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder.
unless further findings were made." and those findings were to be made by
the Court alone.' 56 Based on the testimony of one of the conspirators in the
crime, the trial judge determined that Ring was the one who had actually
shot and killed the driver. 57 The judge also made a finding of two
aggravating factors - that Ring committed the offense in expectation of
receiving something of pecuniary value and that the offense was committed
in an "especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner"--and sentenced Ring
to death. 5 8 In reviewing the death sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court
noted that a correct reading of Arizona law was that the maximum sentence
for first-degree murder was life imprisonment, with the death penalty
becoming an option if the judge makes a finding of a statutory aggravating
factor.159 This interpretation squarely rejects that made by the United
States Supreme Court in Apprendi, that the maximum sentence was
actually the death penalty. 60 The Arizona Supreme Court nonetheless
upheld Ring's death sentence because it was bound by the Supremacy
Clause to apply Walton. 16 ' The United States Supreme Court. however,
found the reasoning of Walton "irreconcilable" with that of Apprendi and
overruled it.' 62 "The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years [as in
Apprendi], but not the fact-finding necessary to put him to death."'1 63 While
some may view the decision of the Court to apply Apprendi to deathpenalty sentencing as an extension of Apprendi, Ring is not a true
extension. It is merely a correct application of the logic of Apprendi.
Justice Breyer, one of the dissenters in Apprendi, concurred in the
judgment of the plurality in Ring, not because he supported the reasoning

153.
154.
155.

156.
157.

158.
159.

160.
161.
162.

163.

See Ring. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

Id. at 589.

/d.at 591.

/d. at 592.

hi. at 594.

Ring. 536 U.S. at 594-95.
Id. at 596.
Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466. 496-97 (2000).
Ring, 536 U.S. at 596.
id. at 589.
Id. at 609.
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of the Court that the judgment was required by the Sixth Amendment right
to trial by jury, but because he believed that the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments required that the decision to
sentence a defendant to death be made by a jury. not a judge.'( 4 Breyer
thought the jury to be "uniquely capable" of determining whether capital
punishment is appropriate in that the jury would reflect the conscience of
the community on the issue of life or death. 165 Breyer was strongly
criticized by Justice Scalia for his reliance on the Eighth Amendment to
uphold Ring because Scalia believed that the line of Eighth Amendment
cases starting with Furman v. Georgia, 66 that required states to specify
"aggravating factors" in order to1 impose the death penalty. "had no proper
foundation in the Constitution." 67
In a strong dissent to Ring, Justice O'Connor stated that while she
understood how the reasoning of Walton was irreconcilable with that of
Apprendi, as she had expressed in her dissent in Apprendi. she would
choose to overrule Apprendi instead of Walton. 168
She once again
conveyed her belief that the decision in Apprendi was not supported by the
Constitution, history or past precedent, and that it ignored the history of
discretionary sentencing by judges in the United States. 169 Significantly,
O'Connor noted that the practical impact of Apprendi has been great on the
court system.170 According to her research, as of May 31. 2002, less than
two years after the decision in Apprendi, the federal appellate courts had
decided approximately 1,802 cases in which the defendants had challenged
either their sentences or their convictions under Apprendi.'7 1 O'Connor
claimed that these federal cases were just the "tip of the iceberg" since
most of the criminal cases in the nation are heard at the state level and not
the federal level. 172 She noted that appeals brought under Apprendi are
burdening an "already overburdened judiciary," and the decision in Ring
will significantly add to that burden because it in effect declared the capital

164.

Id. at 614.

165.
Id. at 615-16.
166.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
167.
Ring. 536 U.S. at 610. Scalia's exact words in criticism of Justice Breyer are
worth noting: "There is really no way in which JUSTICE BREYER can travel with the
happy band that reaches today's result unless he says yes to Apprendi. Concisely put.
JUSTICE BREYER is on the wrong flight: he should either get off before the doors close.
or buy a ticket to Apprendi-land." Id. at 613 (emphasis in original).
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Id. at 619.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 620.
172.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 620.
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sentencing schemes of five states unconstitutional and left in question the
schemes in four other states in which the jury renders an advisory opinion,
but the judge makes the final decision. 73 If the death row inmates in those
nine states were to appeal after Ring, the courts of those states would be
burdened with approximately 797 additional appeals. 74 Thus, based on
these practical considerations, and the fact that the rule in Apprendi had no
basis, Justice O'Connor would choose to overrule Apprendi rather than
Walton.
C. HARRIS V. UNITED STATES

Harrisv. United States, a plurality decision, had the greatest impact of
all the 2002 cases on the reach of Apprendi. Harrisended all speculation
concerning the application of Apprendi to mandatory minimums and
clearly indicates that the Court has failed to find any definite principle to
unite its decisions in regards to what are elements of a crime and what are
sentencing factors. The defendant, Harris, sold illegal drugs out of his
1 75
pawnshop and kept an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side.
Harris was arrested for violating federal drug and firearms laws, including
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), 7 6 which allows for an increased sentence from
five to seven years for brandishing a firearm. 77 Considering brandishing to
be a sentencing factor, the prosecution made no mention of it in the
indictment.178 After Harris was found guilty, the trial judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Harris had brandished a gun and, as
required by statute, sentenced him to seven years in prison. 79 Harris

Id. at 620-21.
Id.
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 550 (2002).
It states:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of not less than 10 years.
18 U.S.C. §924 (2000).
177.
Harris, 536 U.S. at 550-5 1.
178.
Id. at 551.
179.
Id.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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appealed in light of Apprendi, but the Court of Appeals affirmed,
determining that the statute in question made brandishing a sentencing
factor instead of an element of the offense. 80
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and a plurality affirmed the
Court of Appeals.18 1 In coming to their decision, the Court first looked at
the structure of the statute to determine if brandishing was intended by
Congress to be an element of the offense or a sentencing factor. 8 2 Based
on the fact that the statute was broken down into a principal paragraph
listing the elements of a complete crime followed by subsections
explaining how defendants are to be sentenced, the Court determined that
the structure of the statute indicated brandishing was intended by Congress
to be a sentencing factor.1 3 This determination was not dispositive,
however, since the carjacking statute in Jones v. United States had a similar4
structure and was interpreted as listing elements of multiple offenses.'
Another factor the Court considered was whether the provisions at issue in
the statute "altered the defendant's punishment in a manner not usually
associated with sentencing factors."' 85 In Jones, the Court placed great
emphasis on the fact that the three subsections of the carjacking statute
imposed significantly higher penalties, enhancing the defendant's sentence
from fifteen years, to twenty-five years, to life. 86 The statute in question in
Harris, on the other hand, only affected the minimum that the judge could
impose-five years, seven years or ten years-and still allowed the judge
to impose a sentence in excess of those minimums.' 87 The Court felt that
these provisions were more in line with "traditional understandings about
how sentencing factors operate."' 88' In looking at the structure of the statute
in question in Harris and the penalties imposed, the Court seems to be
engaging in an ad hoc analysis of what statutes fall under the Apprendi
rule. The Court engaged in the same type of analysis in Castillo v. United
States, decided the same month as Apprendi. 89 In Castillo, the Court
considered a firearms statute that imposed increased mandatory minimums
based on the type of firearm used. 190 The Court determined unanimously

180.
181.
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184.
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186.
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188.
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Id.at 551-52.
Id. at 552.
Harris, 536 U.S. at 552.
Id. at 552-53.
Id. at 553.
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Harris, 536 U.S. at 554.
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Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000).
Id. at 122.
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that Castillo was a "stronger 'separate crime' case than either Jones or
Almendarez-Torres," based on some of the same factors considered in
Jones.19' If this type of analysis is required of every statute that is
questionable under Apprendi, then there appears to be no need for a brightline rule that requires consideration of only those statutes that increase the
defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum.
The Court in Harris next sought to make a distinction between
Apprendi and McMillan once again.
McMillan and Apprendi are consistent because there is a
fundamental distinction between the factual findings that
were at issue in those two cases. Apprendi said that any
fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the
maximum authorized by the jury's verdict would have
been considered an element of an aggravated crime - and
thus the domain of the jury-by those who framed the Bill
of Rights. The same cannot be said of a fact increasing the
mandatory minimum (but not extending the sentence
beyond the statutory maximum), for the jury's verdict has
authorized the judge to impose the minimum with or
without the finding. 192
The Court's reliance on those facts that would be considered elements
of an aggravated crime by those who framed the Bill of Rights seems
misplaced, however, since mandatory minimums did not exist at the time
the Bill of Rights was passed. As the Court admits, mandatory minimums
were largely a product of the Twentieth Century.' 93 So while it is true that
"[t]here was no comparable historical practice of submitting facts
increasing the mandatory minimum to the jury,"' 194 that is not because
legislators in the Nineteenth Century made a conscious choice to do so, but
simply because mandatory minimums did not exist at that time. Thus,
history does not appear to provide strong support for the Court's distinction
between McMillan, and consequently Harris, and Apprendi. The Court
instead appears to be searching for a way to justify its decision in Apprendi
without taking the next logical step of overruling McMillan, thereby
invalidating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
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Justice Breyer concurred in Harris, but still refused to support the
decision in Apprendi. His basis for concurring in the judgment was that he
believed, as he always had, that the "Sixth Amendment permits judges to
apply sentencing factors-whether those factors lead to a sentence beyond
the statutory maximum (as in Apprendi) or the application of a mandatory
minimum (as here)."' 95 Breyer clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with
mandatory minimum sentences as a matter of policy, 96 but he did not
believe that applying Apprendi in this case would
lead Congress to change
97
sentencing.
minimum
mandatory
abolish
or
Justice Thomas, writing the dissent in Harris, emphasized that the
plurality's holding "rests on either a misunderstanding or a rejection of the
very principles that animated Apprendi."'198 Thomas would instead apply
Apprendi to the situation in Harris because "[a]s a matter of common
sense, an increased mandatory minimum heightens the loss of liberty and
represents the increased stigma society attaches to the offense."' 99
Therefore, determinations of facts that lead to an increased mandatory
minimum sentence should receive the same constitutional protection as do
determinations of facts that increase the sentence beyond the statutory
maximum. 2 °0 "Whether one raises the floor or raises the ceiling it is
impossible to dispute that the defendant is exposed to greater punishment
than is otherwise prescribed. ' 0 ' If Apprendi does not apply to Harris,
brandishing would remain a sentencing factor even if the mandatory
minimum for carrying a firearm without brandishing was five years, and
20 2
the mandatory minimum for brandishing increased to life imprisonment.
"The result must be the same because surely our fundamental constitutional
principles cannot alter depending on degrees of sentencing severity, 2 °3 as
was suggested by the plurality in distinguishing Jones. If the result remains
the same, however, then allowing judicial determination of any fact within
the range allowed by statute permits legislatures, as commentators
predicted after Apprendi, to avoid application of Apprendi with "clever

195.
Id. at 569.
196.
Breyer disapproved of mandatory minimums because they deny judges the
power to depart downward in the case of extraordinary circumstances that may call for
leniency and because mandatory minimums transfer too much power to prosecutors, who
can determine sentences by the charges they bring. Id. at 570-71.
197.
Harris,536 U.S. at 571.
198.
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202.
203.
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statutory drafting. '' 20 4 Thomas believed that the same principle that drove
the Apprendi decision must apply equally to Harrisbecause in both cases
the defendant was unable to "predict the judgment from the face of the
felony . . . and [because] the absolute statutory limits of his punishment
change, constituting an increased penalty., 20 5 Thus, according to Thomas,
the Supreme Court must "maintain [an] absolute fidelity" to Apprendi and
the "protections of the individual afforded by the notice, trial by jury, and
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirements,"20 6which the plurality failed to do
by declining to apply Apprendi to Harris.
IV. THE FUTURE OF APPRENDI

A. WHY APPRENDI SHOULD BE OVERRULED

As illustrated, the Supreme Court has been unable to hold to any
consistent principle in its attempt to protect defendants at sentencing. The
Court refused to overrule Almendarez-Torres in Apprendi, even though its
holding went explicitly against that of Apprendi in allowing courts to use
prior convictions to increase a defendant's sentence above the statutory
maximum. Instead, the Court decided to make prior convictions an
exception to the Apprendi rule because the "procedural safeguards attached
to the 'fact' of a prior conviction make a sentence enhancement based on
recidivism more constitutionally acceptable than other sentence
enhancements based on factual determinations made by a judge."20 7 This
exception overlooks the fact that a defendant may choose to argue that the
prior conviction was wrongly attributed to him.20 8 Apprendi denies that
defendant the opportunity to argue before a jury that beyond a reasonable
doubt the conviction was not his, even if it may raise his sentence beyond
the statutory maximum. The holding in Almendarez-Torres and the Court's
refusal to overrule it in Apprendi is one illustration of the Court's failure to
hold to a unified principle to protect defendants' rights in the sentencing
arena.
A further example of the inconsistency of the Court's decisions
surrounding Apprendi is its failure to overrule McMillan in Harris. In
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refusing to apply Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentencing schemes, the
Court further obscured the principle behind its rule. As Justice Thomas
stated in his dissent in Harris,imposing an increased mandatory minimum
on a defendant "heightens the loss of liberty and represents the increased
stigma society attaches to the offense.",209 Take the armed robbery example
given at the beginning of this article. Both defendants were charged for the
exact same crime, but Defendant One, who received the protections of
Apprendi, received a lesser sentence than Defendant Two, who was
sentenced under a mandatory minimum scheme and was therefore not
protected by Apprendi. The loss of liberty and stigma suffered by
Defendant Two would undoubtedly be much higher because he received a
life sentence rather than the thirty years Defendant One was given. So in
failing to protect Defendant Two by requiring his sentence enhancements
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court made the safeguards of
Apprendi practically meaningless. In addition, the only real difference
between the cases of Defendant One and Defendant Two is the way their
respective legislatures drafted their statutes. By making the maximum
penalty for armed robbery life imprisonment, the legislature in Defendant
Two's state effectively removed from the jury determination of any fact
that would increase the defendant's sentence to that level, and gave the
judge power to determine the factors that increased the mandatory
minimum, as allowed by the Court under Harris. The true impact of
Harris is "to give legislators far more leeway to label facts as sentencing
factors rather than as elements of the offense - meaning that they can be
found by judges rather than by juries, and by a preponderance of the
evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt., 210 Harris supports
Justice O'Connor's claim that the ruling in Apprendi was purely formalistic
in that states would be able to avoid it by clever statutory draftingincreasing maximum penalties so that all sentences imposed by the courts
fall within the range allowed by the jury verdict. 21' "Had the HarrisCourt
instead extended the principles of Apprendi to mandatory minimum
sentences, the clear message would have been that Apprendi, and the Sixth
Amendment protections that it sought to vindicate, cannot be easily
evaded.21 2 Instead the HarrisCourt sent the message that the Court is not
completely sold on the principles of Apprendi and how they should be
applied. It is important to note that the validity of Harris remains
questionable, however, since it was only supported by a plurality of the
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Court and since the Court has taken a "volatile approach" to sentencing in
recent years.21 3 In fact the Court in Harriswas split evenly as to whether to
apply Apprendi to mandatory minimums with the deciding vote being that
of Breyer, who refused to support Apprendi, but who believed that judges
should be able to consider any sentencing factors, whether they increase the
statutory maximum or apply a mandatory minimum.

21 4

Thus, the Court

could easily go the other way the next time they consider the applicability
of Apprendi to mandatory minimums.
While the Court's decision in Harriscleared up any conjecture as to
whether Apprendi applies to mandatory minimums, at least for now, its
recent decisions further solidified the other two practical problems resulting
from the Apprendi rule. First, as mentioned when discussing mandatory
minimums, Apprendi can still easily be avoided by legislative manipulation
of statutes. By allowing legislatures a way out of the Apprendi rule, the
Court effectively eliminates any protection the rule may have afforded
defendants. In fact, it "encourages any legislature interested in asserting
control over the sentencing process to do so by creating those [mandatory]
minimums. That result would mean significantly less procedural fairness,
not more. 21 5 Second, the Court's recent decisions illustrate that even if
legislatures choose not to redraft their statutes, the protections afforded by
Apprendi may be unclear. "At a minimum, Apprendi is likely a doubleedged sword. 216 For example, prior to Apprendi, when a defendant pled
guilty to a drug charge, he did not have to admit a particular quantity until
the sentencing hearing. After Apprendi, however, the defendant must
admit the amount in the plea agreement and as a result loses any
opportunity to dispute the quantity at sentencing.The Court's recent
decisions did not address this problem, or the fact that under Apprendi
defendants may be forced to make arguments in the alternative. For
example, if the defendant mentioned above went to trial instead of
pleading, he would be forced to argue both that he did not commit the
drug
21 8
offense, but if he did, he had in his possession less than fifty grams.
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B. ALTERNATIVES TO THE RULE IN APPRENDI

Due to these practical considerations and the fact that the Court has
been unable to consistently follow the principle adopted in Apprendi. the
Court should overrule Apprendi and adopt a rule that would better protect
defendants at the sentencing stage. "Given the stakes at sentencing.
Apprendi is right to worry about the reliability of the process" so that even
if "'sentencing factors need not be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. they may still deserve some procedural safeguards under the Due
Process Clause."-2'9 The most logical approach to protecting the procedural
due process rights of defendants during sentencing is to grant defendants
more rights during sentencing. These rights would extend to all defendants
at sentencing, not just those looking at sentences in excess of the statutory
maximum. Granting these rights during sentencing rather than during the
trial would alleviate concerns with mandatory minimums, legislative
manipulation of statutes, prejudicial juries, inconsistent defenses. and plea
bargaining. While overruling Apprendi would leave the decision of what
are elements of a crime and what are sentencing factors to legislatures.
defendants would still be protected "from the potentially arbitrary exercise
of power by prosecutors and judges" 220 by extending them procedural
protections at sentencing.
The most effective alternative to protect defendants at sentencing
would be to raise the standard of proof for sentencing factors from
preponderance of the evidence to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
same standard a jury would be required to apply during trial. Raising the
standard of proof would achieve the same results desired by the Court in
Apprendi, requiring facts that increase the statutory maximum to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, 22' and the higher standard would also protect
those not included in the Apprendi rule who are sentenced under mandatory
minimum sentencing schemes. Use of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
would ensure more uniform sentencing decisions for all similarly situated
defendants. Take the example given at the beginning of this article. The
result for Defendant One would not change because the prosecution would
still be unable to prove the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt,
this time to the judge instead of the jury. The judge would once again be
constrained by the fifty-year maximum sentence and would once again
decide to impose a thirty-year sentence instead based on mitigating factors.
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The result for Defendant Two, who was sentenced to life imprisonment
under Apprendi, would change dramatically. The jury would again find
Defendant Two guilty of armed robbery, requiring the judge to impose a
thirty-year sentence, but at sentencing the prosecution would be unable to
prove the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt while previously
they were able to prove them by a preponderance of the evidence.
Therefore, the judge would not be required to impose the mandatory life
sentence. While the judge would still have discretion to impose a sentence
higher than the thirty-year mandatory minimum, under this alternative the
judge could take into account mitigating factors, such as this being
Defendant Two's first offense, and he could choose to limit the sentence to
thirty years. Considering that Defendant One and Defendant Two
committed the same exact crime in the same manner, the result under this
alternative appears more equitable than that achieved under Apprendi.
In addition to resolving problems for defendants sentenced under
mandatory minimums, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt at
sentencing would also alleviate the other practical problems that result
from the Court's holding in Apprendi. First, legislatures would not be able
to get around this requirement by redrafting statutes. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt at sentencing would apply to any aggravating factor,
whether it raised the maximum sentence or the sentence within a statute's
range. Therefore, no amount of alteration to a statute would place it
outside the requirement. Second, this alternative would not require proof
of aggravating factors to be produced at trial before the jury because it
would not be relevant to the determination of the elements of the crime.
This change avoids the risk of prejudicing the jury against the defendant in
determining if he committed the substantive offense, and it saves the
defendant from having to argue inconsistent defenses. Finally, requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt at sentencing would avoid the negative
effects of Apprendi on plea bargaining. Defendants would retain their
constitutional right to be heard on enhancements because they would no
longer be part of the guilt phase of the trial. And prosecutors would lose
their ability to control the defendant's sentence since the judge would now
be able to check that power at the sentencing stage. Thus, from a practical
standpoint, insisting on proof beyond a reasonable doubt at sentencing
provides more consistent and fair protection of the procedural due process
rights of defendants than the rule set out in Apprendi.
While the above alternative seems to be adequate protection for
defendants at sentencing, some commentators have suggested other
alternatives that could be adopted to provide even further protection. One
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alternative would be to require the government to provide defendants with
notice of all aggravating sentencing factors that they may pursue.22 2
"Defendants need notice not only to contest enhancements at sentencing,
but to decide whether to plead guilty and on what terms. 223 This would
avoid the "inherent unfairness" that results when a defendant is allowed to
plead guilty before he is advised of the maximum punishment that may be

imposed against him. 224 Another alternative that would further protect a

defendant would be to apply relevant state or federal rules of evidence to
sentencing. 225 "Rules of evidence are not ill-suited to determine the
quantity of drugs involved in a defendant's offense, and they are not less
worthwhile than at trial when, in either case, ,ears of a person's freedom
Application of rules of
may depend on this factual determination."
evidence would prevent the judge from considering hearsay or irrelevant
evidence in determining the defendant's final sentence, which would
ultimately be more fair to the defendant, although it would also prevent the
defendant from introducing his own hearsay or irrelevant evidence to rebut
the prosecution. A final alternative would be to enhance the defendant's
ability to conduct discovery before sentencing. 227 "Creating a substantial
right of discovery after a plea or guilty verdict would give defendants
access to all the evidence that the fact-finder might deem relevant to
While these three additional
aggravating sentencing factors. 22 8
alternatives would further protect the defendant at sentencing, simply
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravating factors at
sentencing would achieve the same objectives as the rule in Apprendi and
avoid a majority of its pitfalls.
-

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's Apprendi decision in 2000 had the potential to
wreak havoc on determinate sentencing schemes throughout the country. It
had commentators speculating on its potential effects and on how far the
Supreme Court was going to allow it to reach. In the 2002 term, however,
the Court stopped Apprendi dead in its tracks and completely obscured the
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principle behind it. Apprendi sought to extend to defendants the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of trial by jury when judges determined facts that
extended their sentences beyond the maximum allowed by statute.22 9 The
reasoning behind applying constitutional protection in these cases was that
the increase in the defendant's sentence impacted his "very liberty" and
heightened the stigma that would attach to his crime.2 30 The Court stayed
true to this reasoning by refusing to uphold Arizona's capital-sentencing
scheme in Ring v. Arizona, but in upholding Harristhe Court allowed for
the continuation of a mandatory minimum sentencing scheme that at the
very least impacts a defendant's liberty and heightens the stigma that
attaches to his crime. The Court's decision in Harris thus reduced its
holding in Apprendi to "pure formalism," rejecting any application of the
underlying principle that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that has the
effect, in real terms, of increasing the maximum punishment beyond an
otherwise applicable23range must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.", '
In addition, the Court failed in Apprendi or any of its recent decisions
to address the practical implications of Apprendi's rule. Real world
application of the rule demonstrates few benefits for the defendants it was
intended to protect and tremendous burdens. Defendants are forced under
Apprendi to argue alternative, often inconsistent defenses. Juries are given
information concerning aggravating factors that may result in prejudice
against defendants when determining guilt or innocence. Defendants lose
some of the advantages of plea bargaining while prosecutors gain more
power to control sentences. Undoubtedly, some defendants will benefit
from the Court's rule, but the vast majority will be fighting an even harder
uphill battle than before. As Justice O'Connor stated in her Apprendi
dissent, the Court's rule "accords, at best, marginal protections for the
constitutional rights that it seeks to effectuate. 232
The best course of action for the Supreme Court at this time would be
to overrule Apprendi and adopt an alternative more likely to consistently
protect the procedural due process rights of criminal defendants at
sentencing. "Ultimately, criminal sentencing is about due process checked
by practicality, fairness checked by feasibility. . . . Justice requires both
uniformity, where similar offenders who commit similar offenses are
sentenced similarly, and fairness, where the sentencing judge considers all
of the exigencies of a particular situation so that a just sentence is
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imposed. 233 Putting the authority to determine aggravating factors back
into the hands of judges, but requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
would be an effective way to ensure fairness and uniformity in sentencing.
This alternative would protect all defendants equally at sentencing, not just
those indicted under a statute permitting an increase in the maximum
punishment based on a finding of certain aggravating factors. Additionally,
this alternative addresses the practical problems created by the Apprendi
rule. Defendants would no longer be required to argue inconsistent
defenses before a jury, resulting in prejudice. Defendants could still take
advantage of plea bargaining without losing the ability to challenge
enhancements at sentencing. Ultimately, defendants would receive far
more effective procedural due process protection than they currently
receive under Apprendi's bright-line rule by simply requiring that all
aggravating factors be proven at the sentencing phase beyond a reasonable
doubt.
CHARLOTTE
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